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INTRODUCTION
Professor Robert Churchill passed away as this article underwent publication. 
Though Bob was formally trained as a physical geographer, he eventually became 
the backbone of Middlebury College’s GIS and cartography program, and an irre-
placeable member of the geography department. Family, colleagues, students, and 
the entire Middlebury College Community miss Bob’s anecdotes, his kindness, 
and his easy laughter.
The last two decades have seen a marked rise in the number of maps 
in the popular media, yet academic interest in journalistic cartogra-
phy remains low, though the bulk of the public relies on the media 
for its geographic knowledge. Because they invoke a sense of belong-
ing, identity, and allegiance, the number of media maps, like flags and 
other patriotic icons, increases during conflict. From the U.S. invasion 
of Afghanistan until the proclamation of victory in Iraq almost two 
years later, three major American news magazines published nearly 200 
related maps. Early maps of Afghanistan affirmed U.S. military prow-
ess and promised quick retribution, but with the failure of this promise, 
pointed to obstacles from terrain to climate. As interest in Afghanistan 
cooled and rhetoric over Iraq heated up, cartographic attention shifted 
accordingly. Initial maps of Iraq were provocative, focusing especially 
on the state’s supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction. 
Maps again depicted American military might, and as the invasion pro-
gressed seemingly unimpeded, Baghdad came into cartographic focus. 
In these compositions the melding of artwork, remotely sensed images, 
and photography lends even greater veracity to the maps themselves, 
which not only convey but also construct both political and geographic 
knowledge.
KEYWORDS: media maps, journalistic cartography, political cartography, 
war on terrorism
fter weeks of posturing and ultimatums, the United States invaded 
Iraq on March 19, 2003. Although the most visible and rehearsed 
justification for this action was Iraq’s alleged and much publicized posses-
sion of weapons of mass destruction, some of the earliest rationalization 
for military action was based on the assertion that Iraq was harboring 
members of Al Qaeda and the more general allegation that Iraq was a 
sponsor of terrorism against the United States. Ironically, Iraq escaped 
notice almost entirely in discussions of global terrorism following Septem-
ber 11, 2001, and in the search for perpetrators of the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon. That search instead quickly narrowed in 
on Afghanistan when it seemed certain that Osama bin Laden and high 
ranking members of Al Qaeda had taken refuge there. Afghanistan con-
tinued to receive headline attention in the months that followed until the 
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threat posed by Saddam Hussein—whether or not that threat was real and 
imminent—reached a crescendo, drawing attention away from Afghani-
stan and shifting the story to Iraq. A public who had become familiar with 
Afghanistan was now compelled to learn a new geography.
For the majority of people, this geography was undoubtedly learned 
(if at all) from the media, most emphatically and effectively through maps 
(Monmonier, 1989; Vujakovic, 1999a). Media maps define place in the 
mind of the public, but maps impart far more than location, size, shape, 
place names, and other lessons of rudimentary geography. Because they 
are, in a very real sense, creations of prevailing society, maps present a 
view of the world that is conditioned by social norms and the values and 
ideologies of their makers (Kosonen, 1999). For the war in Iraq, media 
maps offer an alternative form of discourse, one that may provide insight 
into those norms, values, and ideologies and how they change through 
time, as well as some sense of the function of the map itself in molding 
and mirroring public perception and beliefs. Our purpose is to examine 
cartographic representation of the conflict in Iraq and the period preced-
ing the conflict, and to consider what messages were being conveyed, how 
those messages may have been assimilated and understood by readers, 
and how and why the messages changed through time.
Maps, Media, Message
In response to the increased appearance of maps in the popular media that 
followed the innovations in cartographic production and design of World 
War II, Ristow initiated an academic dialogue on the role of journalistic 
cartography (1957). Similar to the increase documented by Ristow in the 
middle of the last century, the number of maps appearing in the print me-
dia has increased profoundly in recent years largely as the consequence of 
desktop mapping and related computer technologies (Monmonier, 1989; 
2001). As these technologies continue to evolve, the sophistication as well 
as the quantity of media maps continues to increase (Herzog, 2003). Some 
anticipated that the growing number of maps resulting from technologi-
cal innovation would stimulate greater academic interest in journalistic 
cartography (Gilmartin, 1985). Two decades later, however, research has 
failed to keep pace with the proliferation of media maps (Perkins and 
Barry, 1996).
This lack of interest is curious and not easily explained. Certainly in 
the past, academic cartographers were quick to exorcise maps that did not 
adhere to the prevailing rules of expressiveness (Harley, 1989). Academic 
cartographers may show little interest in journalistic maps for fear that 
these non-academically trained mapmakers will ignore their ideas and 
input (Gilmartin, 1997). The limited study of journalistic maps, in some 
part, may also be a consequence of the intellectual privileging of text at 
the expense of image. The historic paucity of maps in newspapers has 
been attributed to the opportunity costs they exact. Printing a map means 
sacrificing text, and Ferris (1993) maintained that above all, editors are 
word people. Momentarily accepting this argument to explain the dearth 
of media maps in the past, and perhaps the lack of research interest in 
journalistic cartography as well, it is not clear whether the profusion of 
maps in recent years reflects an increasingly visual society or an emerging 
recognition by the media of the power and authority that maps hold.
To the extent that media maps have received any attention, it has usu-
ally been to critique their design and effectiveness (Balchin, 1985; Gauth-
ier, 1988). No doubt the choice of projection or how a map is centered or 
how data are generalized are important questions that influence public 
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perception of geography, but what may be implicit in these concerns, 
and of greater, overarching importance, are the messages conveyed by 
journalistic maps, especially given the acknowledged role of the media in 
the geographic education of the public at large. Like all maps, those that 
appear in the media are potent and readily recognizable emblems, icons 
that can assert territorial dominance and define geopolitical perceptions 
(Anderson, 1991; Kosonen, 1999). Moreover, because they articulate both 
a sense of place as well as relations among people and place, maps are 
instrumental not just in the representation or even the interpretation of 
geographical knowledge but in its construction (Crampton, 2002).
Based on these arguments, a dramatic increase in the number of maps 
of Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11 is not sur-
prising. In spite of the fact that 15 of the terrorists directly involved in the 
September 11 attacks were Saudis, the responsibility for those attacks was 
attributed almost solely to Afghanistan by geographical association both 
with Osama bin Laden and with global terrorism more generally. Media 
maps provided not only an important geographical frame of reference for 
this story but, by articulating the enemy, reasserted and perhaps redefined 
the identity of the United States which momentarily had assumed the role 
of victim (Churchill and Slarsky, 2004). But as the action in Afghanistan 
wore on with the failure to find bin Laden, what story did the maps tell? 
With escalating tensions in Iraq and increasingly bellicose rhetoric, the os-
tensible importance of Afghanistan began to diminish. As a consequence, 
a shift in cartographic focus and a corresponding increase in the number 
of maps of Iraq might well be expected. What may be less obvious and 
predictable, however, are the arguments embedded in the shifting carto-
graphic representations of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Maps in News Weeklies
To better understand the dialectic between media maps and society, we 
examined all maps that appeared in three major news magazines, News-
week, Time, and U.S. News and World Report, from October 15, 2001 through 
September 30, 2003. We elected to focus on these publications for several 
reasons. First, we were concerned that the sheer number of maps ap-
pearing in newspapers of record during this period of time would be too 
voluminous to permit close scrutiny. Second, while newspaper maps have 
increased markedly both in quantity and quality (Ferris, 1993), the greater 
lead time of news magazines, as well as higher print quality, accommodate 
compositions that are graphically sophisticated and rich in content. Maps 
displayed on television are disadvantaged by brief exposure time, and al-
though this is not true for the Internet, the comparatively low resolution of 
display devices continues to limit the content of maps both on the Internet 
and on television. Furthermore, maps in news magazines are intended not 
only to provide geographic reference and to draw people into the story 
but, increasingly, to tell the story as stand-alone compositions (Ohls-
son, 1988). Indeed, there is some indication that people often do study 
the maps without reading the accompanying story (Perkins and Barry, 
1996). Finally, even though these magazines may have different editorial 
perspectives, they are intended to appeal to a broad national readership 
rather than regional markets, and hence may offer a more comprehensive 
reflection than newspapers of the interrelations between maps and society.
In all we examined 189 maps that related to global terrorism, the pur-
suit of terrorists in Afghanistan, and the emerging military engagement 
in Iraq. Because actions in both Afghanistan and Iraq were predicated on 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, we also included 
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maps that involved the events and the aftermath of September 11. Nearly 
all these maps were printed in color; 54 were double-page spreads; and 19 
more occupied full-page layouts. Although no map can be wholly neutral 
in position, the great majority of those we examined were clearly exposi-
tory in nature. Many relied on symbols such as flashpoints, targets, and 
encircling arrows, for example, while many more were embellished with 
photographs, satellite imagery, and artistic renderings of aircraft, weap-
ons, and soldiers. Only about one-fifth of the maps were sufficiently free 
of such obvious symbology and imagery that they could be considered 
simple reference or locator maps. There was not great disparity in the 
number of maps of Afghanistan and Iraq that appeared over the period of 
study, but predictably, the geographical focus changed through time, as 
did the character and tone of the maps themselves, albeit in more subtle 
fashion.
Obstacles in Afghanistan
Although terrorism defies geographic boundaries, the demand for retribu-
tion for the attacks of September 11, 2001 necessitated the clear definition 
of an enemy and conjunctively, the identification of a place on the map—a 
set of boundaries to geographically define and contain that enemy. With 
Osama bin Laden reportedly holed up there, Afghanistan filled that need 
quite effectively, and within a matter of days, media maps made the tran-
sition from depicting domestic attack sites and global terrorism in general 
to representation of Afghanistan and military actions against terrorists 
harbored within its borders.
Like the composition in Time from October 22, 2001 (Figure 1), the maps 
that appeared initially in the news weeklies were consistently aggressive 
in tone. Here Afghanistan is surrounded, if not pinned down, by callouts 
Figure 1. “Battleground Briefing.” Time, 22 October, 2001. © 2006 Time Inc. All rights reserved. 
Reprinted from Time Magazine ® with permission. Cartography by Missy Adams and Joe 
Lertola.(see page 87 for color version)
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and contained by a distinct orange line which, together with images of 
aircraft, a photograph highlighting damage with yellow arrows, and 
flashpoint symbols, attest to the strength of the U.S. military and provide 
cartographic assurance of inevitable and rapid defeat of the enemy.
As actions in Afghanistan continued with failure to find bin Laden, the 
message shifted in subtle but purposeful fashion. Maps began to focus 
on the physical environment with emphasis on rugged terrain, lack of 
the most basic infrastructure, and inhospitable conditions. Of 55 maps of 
Afghanistan included in our study, 48 used shaded-relief or three-dimen-
sional perspectives to depict the terrain, and of the few maps that did not 
use these techniques, nearly all appeared before the end of 2001. The use 
of relief shading and three-dimensional perspectives is surely due in part 
to the fact that off-the-shelf data and sophisticated software make these 
techniques easy to use. Yet the consistent and often dramatic use of these 
effects also goes far to explain any failures in the pursuit of bin Laden and 
Al Qaeda.  In spite of the obvious and profound superiority in weapons 
technology, shown prominently in the offering from US News and World 
Report (Figure 2), intensely rugged terrain devoid of roads, settlements, 
Figure 2. “Kill Zones.” U.S. News & World Report, 24 December, 2001. Copyright 2001 
U.S. News & World Report, L.P. Reprinted with permission. Cartography by Rob 
Cady, Rod Little, and Doug Stern. (see page 88 for color version)
“Maps began to focus on the 
physical environment with
emphasis on rugged terrain, 
lack of the most basic
infrastructure, and inhospitable 
conditions.”
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and people suggests that actually effecting that damage against the enemy 
may be difficult given the physical environment. 
Barren and bleak terrain, however, was not the only impediment to 
rapid and unequivocal success. Although readers are not allowed to 
disregard the rugged, mountainous landscape, climate was dramatically 
added to the mix in another map from Time, “When Winter Comes” (Fig-
ure 3). If the title alone is not sufficient to cause a chill, the juxtaposition of 
blue tones and call-outs with the white-clad soldier erases any doubt that 
winter conditions will make pursuit of the enemy even more difficult. The 
reader does not have to look at the caption to surmise that the Taliban can 
readily tolerate these conditions, even in the face of well equipped and 
well trained U.S. special forces (although one might question the training 
of a soldier who would consider firing a weapon with its flash suppressor 
and barrel plugged with ice and snow). Clearly, superiority in weapons, 
technology, training, and tactics may not be enough to insure quick and 
complete success in Afghanistan.
Turning Toward Iraq
Although they declined in number, maps of Afghanistan continued to 
appear in the news weeklies on a regular basis through the opening 
months of 2002. By the summer of 2002, however, the agenda of the Bush 
Administration turned from Afghanistan toward Iraq. Maps of Iraq began 
to appear regularly and in greater numbers, while already dwindling car-
tographic interest in Afghanistan became negligible with maps appearing 
only occasionally after the summer of 2002 (Figure 4).
Although the regime of Saddam Hussein would be linked with terror-
ism soon enough, at least rhetorically, the maps that explored the Iraqi 
terrorist threat through the summer of 2002 seemed to present somewhat 
mixed messages. One world map, for example, includes Iraq among states 
Figure 3. “When Winter Comes.” Time, 5 November, 2001. Satellite images courtesy of Space Imag-
ing. © 2006 Time Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted from Time Magazine ® with permission. 
Cartography by Joe Lertola, Missy Adams, and Mitch Frank.  (see page 89 for color version)
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Figure 4. Number of maps of Afghanistan versus Iraq that appeared in three domestic news week-
lies—Time, Newsweek, and US News and World Report—from 15 October, 2001 through 30 
September, 2003.
where Al Qaeda has operated but visually downplays its significance rela-
tive to a number of other countries. Another composition, which explores 
Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts, links Afghanistan and Iraq with a bright, 
sweeping arrow but, in the accompanying text, concludes it doubtful that 
Iraq would provide sanctuary to terrorists. By the fall of 2002, however, 
these ambiguities seem to have been resolved as illustrated by a map 
published in the September 2 issue of Time (Figure 5). The map not only 
indicates that members of Al Qaeda may be taking refuge within the Iraq’s 
borders but also shows a training camp for Iraqi terrorists and “foreign 
extremist Arabs”. If the association with terrorism is not clear enough 
from the content and symbology — the red dripping from the Kurdish 
region at the top of the state, for example — Hussein stands in front of the 
map with hand across his heart yet looking away with an untrustworthy 
squint and a sardonic grin. One inescapable irony here, of course, is that 
fact that alleged Al Qaeda refugees are shown in the Kurdish region of the 
state, but in spite of Saddam Hussein’s contempt for the Kurds, the mere 
presence of Al Qaeda within its borders may be enough to suggest Iraq’s 
culpability in terrorism against the United States.
In light of the message proffered by this map, it bears repeating that 
Iraq escaped attention in the search for global terrorists in the aftermath of 
September 11. Nonetheless, the connection with terrorism was presented 
“If the association with
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      62 Number 54, Spring 2006 cartographic perspectives    
Figure 5. “Saddam’s Game.” Time, 2 September, 2002. © 2006 Time Inc. All rights reserved. 
Reprinted from Time Magazine ® with permission. Cartography by Jackson Dykman. (see page 
90 for color version)
as one of the first transgressions by Iraq, at least cartographically, and one 
of the fundamental provocations in fabricating a rationale for U.S. attack. 
Other arguments followed quickly.
Oil was discussed often enough in the public discourse, but only two of 
nearly 200 maps noted U.S. interest in Iraqi petroleum. Weapons of mass 
destruction attracted far greater attention and were mentioned so fre-
quently, in fact, that WMD became a familiar acronym. Of the numerous 
maps that took weapons of mass destruction as a principal theme, the one 
that appeared in Newsweek on September 16, 2002 (Figure 6) is representa-
tive of the tone and message yet interesting in its own right. Red symbols 
are used to show the location of nuclear, biological, and chemical installa-
tions, as well as sites of ballistic missile production, while military installa-
tions and Saddam’s palaces are depicted in similar black symbols. Arrows 
bring the eye back to the large and menacing cluster around Baghdad. The 
character of the arrows themselves, giving the impression of having been 
hastily drawn with grease pencil or marker, creates a complementary dy-
namic, as if the map was taking shape like a chalk talk or a football play, a 
formative plan of action based on emerging revelation.
Although stylistically distinct, a map that appeared later in Time (Figure 
7) imparts much the same message. Relying on a substantially larger 
scale, this map presents a three-dimensional perspective limited to the 
area around Baghdad, with brightly colored pushpin symbols to suggest 
an alarming concentration of potential weapons sites. This map includes 
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Figure 6. “The Road to Baghdad.” Newsweek, 16 September, 2002. Newsweek—Bonnie Scranton. © 
2002 Newsweek, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission. Cartography by Bonnie Scranton. 
(see page 91 for color version)
Figure 7. “Hide-And-Seek.” Time, 16 December, 2002. © 2006 Time Inc. All rights reserved. 
Reprinted from Time Magazine ® with permission. Cartography by Joe Lertola. (see page 92 for 
color version)
Saddam’s palaces with the suggestion that these facilities too may harbor 
weapons. An inset photograph of the al-Sajoud Palace not only confirms 
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the strategic significance of the presidential compounds but offers implicit 
assurance of the sophistication and reliability of U.S. surveillance and 
intelligence technologies and goes some distance to assuage any lingering 
reservations that the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction is 
real.
Like the picture of the al-Sajoud Palace, photographs are often blended 
with maps, yet it is doubtful that readers could independently identify 
what is being depicted. Immediately following the Chernobyl disaster, an 
image of an Italian concrete factory was passed off as the nuclear complex 
to American television networks (Mitchell, 1992). Like the concrete plant, 
few readers may be able to identify a presidential palace with certainty, 
but given the veracity of the visual image, even fewer are likely to ques-
tion its authenticity. Instead, and especially when used in conjunction with 
a map, photographs and images emphatically underscore the integrity of 
the entire composition.
The public stance of the Bush Administration, as well as much of the 
public dialogue, on both the war in Iraq and the actions in Afghanistan, 
involved a distinct dualism. On the one hand, these were military actions 
that targeted enemies, which were well articulated, both ideologically and 
geographically. On the other hand, a purported objective of these actions 
was to liberate the peoples who had been oppressed by these common 
enemies within. This dualism, however, is not reflected in the maps that 
we examined. Instead, the enemy is most often delineated by geographic 
boundaries through maps like that shown in Figure 8. A U.S. soldier 
equipped with the latest technology literally dwarfs Iraq, which might fit 
conveniently under the trooper’s boot. If this visual metaphor does not 
portray adequately Iraq’s hopeless position, the country is encircled by 
air, navy, and army bases. Text boxes with flags of neighboring states that 
surround Iraq further tighten the noose, even if the role of some of these 
states remains ambiguous.
With Iraq quickly overpowered, at least in the maps on the pages of 
the country’s news weeklies, and with what appeared to be early success 
Figure 8. “Strike Force.” Time, 17 March, 2003. © 2006 Time Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted 
from Time Magazine ® with permission. Cartography by Jackson Dykman. (see page 93 for color 
version)
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of the invasion, cartographic emphasis shifted to Baghdad, an important 
symbolic target and, presumably, the principal strategic objective. Maps 
with titles like “Targeting Baghdad” (2003), “Inside Baghdad” (2003), “Bat-
tle for Baghdad” (2003), and “Pinpointing Baghdad” (2003) speak to the 
importance of the capital, while assuring rapid and successful occupation 
of the city. Nearly all these map compositions use satellite imagery of the 
city in some fashion. Like the photograph, this imagery makes an implicit 
but strong statement about the United States’ technological sophistication, 
its detailed understanding of the city’s geography and crucial infrastruc-
ture. In “Pinpointing Baghdad” (Figure 9), these messages are reinforced 
by ubiquitous flashpoint symbols as well as photographic evidence of 
the effects of technological and military superiority. Like Iraq as a whole, 
Baghdad has been occupied and conquered by maps.
Constructing Geographic Knowledge
No matter how any particular map is interpreted or deconstructed, a 
distinct pattern is unmistakable in the news-weekly maps that appeared 
from the beginning of military action in Afghanistan through the Second 
Gulf War in Iraq. The earliest maps of Afghanistan boasted visually of 
U.S. superiority and seemed to promise quick and complete retribution 
against Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. As the action wore on with, at 
best, limited success, the maps offered up apologies in the form of hostile 
physical environment and absence of infrastructure. With little breaking 
news in Afghanistan, attention began to dwindle as the Bush Administra-
tion looked toward Iraq. Maps now provided justification for an inevitable 
U.S. attack, and although one or two maps explored the possible connec-
tions with international terrorism, the real focus was on weapons of mass 
destruction. The cartographic evidence of these weapons alone offered 
ample justification for military invasion, and with the invasion, once 
again, came maps that demonstrated military might of the United States, 
not unlike those maps that illustrated actions in Afghanistan. Rapid troop 
movement with seemingly few obstacles redirected cartographic attention 
Figure 9. “Pinpointing Baghdad.” Time, 31 March, 2003. © 2006 Time Inc. All rights reserved. 
Reprinted from Time Magazine ® with permission. Satellite image courtesy of DigitalGlobe. (see 
page 94 for color version)
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to the acquisition of Baghdad, surely an important trophy, if not as signifi-
cant as Saddam Hussein himself. Within days of the invasion, until its con-
clusion some three weeks later, maps of Baghdad became the cartographic 
lingua franca in reporting the war.
Although the maps in the news magazines that we examined exhibited 
some distinctive design characteristics and varied significantly in total 
volume among publications, we observed little significant difference in 
cartographic perspective and voice. Compare, for example, the represen-
tations of actions in Afghanistan that appeared in Time (Figure 1) and US 
News and World Report (Figure 2); or contrast the map from Time (Figure 5) 
and Newsweek (Figure 6), both of which impugn the intentions of Saddam 
Hussein. Because collectively these maps are the creations of private com-
mercial entities, they almost certainly are affected by, and to some degree 
reflect, a larger social context. There seems even less question that these 
maps affect the perspectives of their readers, yet any effort to precisely 
and unequivocally associate these perspectives with journalistic maps is 
faced with difficulty at several levels.
From a methodological point of view alone, assessing empirically how 
these maps shape and transform geographic knowledge for their audience 
seems a daunting task, the more so when photographs and images add 
color, dimension, and veracity to the cartographic message. A credibly de-
signed study that might conclude ‘Such and such a percentage of the pub-
lic believes that failure to root out Osama bin Laden is due to impediments 
depicted on media maps’ is clearly impracticable. Because Americans are 
exposed to an almost countless number of maps and map images daily, 
because ours is a map immersed society, much of the message conveyed 
by media maps may be subtle if not entirely subliminal (Vujakovic, 1999b; 
Gilmartin, 1988). And since the makers of these maps are immersed in 
the same social fabric and subject to the same values and dialogues, it can 
not be tacitly assumed that the display of power or strength or technical 
superiority in their maps is a deliberate and conscious act. Most often, we 
suspect there is no such deliberate intent (Pugliese, 1988). Some members 
of the Geopolitik school, for example, implored each other to be scrupu-
lously objective in constructing their maps for fear of losing credibility, yet 
in contemporary context, the resulting maps appear markedly subjective if 
not blatantly propagandistic (Herb, 1997).
That media maps are likely not conceived to advertently advance a 
particular point of view but rather are inadvertently influenced by the 
social context and ideological values of their makers may confound rather 
than clarify efforts to understand the role of these maps in the public dis-
course. But the greater irony here is that for the same reasons their effects 
are difficult to measure, the impact and importance of media maps are 
undeniable. From print to television to the Internet, maps have become an 
integral and ubiquitous element of the social dialectic. Because the public 
accepts these maps as the first line of geographic knowledge, coupled 
perhaps with a lack of cartographic understanding, maps speak with 
unquestioned authority, an authority that is almost certainly reinforced by 
the sophisticated and complexly layered confections in which these maps 
are often presented.
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